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ABSTRACT
This paper investigates the role of product upgrades and consumer switching costs in the tying of
complementary products. Previous analyses of tying have found that a monopolist of one product
cannot increase its profits and reduce social welfare by tying and monopolizing a complementary
product if the initial monopolized product is essential, where essential means that all uses of the
complementary good require the initial monopolized product. We show that this is not true in
durable-goods settings characterized by product upgrades, where we show tying is especially
important when consumer switching costs are present. In addition to our results concerning tying our
analysis also provides a new rationale for leasing in durable-goods markets. We also discuss various
extensions including the role of the reversibility of tying as well as the antitrust implications of our
analysis.
Dennis W. Carlton













Despite the increased interest in tie-in sales stimulated in part by the Microsoft case, little 
research has examined the consequences of tying a durable good to the purchase of a monopolized good.  
This is quite odd because many tie-ins such as Microsoft’s tie-in of applications software with its 
operating system involve durable goods.  This paper shows that certain features of durable goods such as 
upgrades and switching costs create an incentive to tie in a much broader set of circumstances than is 
suggested by the previous literature.  Whinston’s (1990) classic paper on tying derived conditions under 
which tying was not profitable.  This paper shows that in durable-goods settings tying can be profitable 
even when those conditions appear to be satisfied.  Moreover, this paper provides an explanation for 
some of Microsoft’s behavior that previous theory has been unable to explain.  Finally, this paper 
provides a new rationale for leasing.1    
  There are a number of analyses in which a monopolist of a primary product employs tying of a 
complementary product to monopolize the tied market and earn additional profits in that market.2  A 
common feature shared by these analyses, however, is that the primary product is not essential.  That is, 
there are uses of the complementary good that do not require the primary product.  In fact, Whinston 
(1990) showed under a wide variety of conditions that, if the primary product is essential for all uses of 
the complementary good, then tying cannot be used to increase monopoly profits.3  From the standpoint 
of applying these previous analyses to Microsoft’s actions, this feature of those analyses is problematic.  
For the type of applications program that Microsoft bundles with Windows the Windows operating 
system is frequently essential, and thus these previous analyses provide little rationale for why Microsoft 
has chosen to bundle applications programs with Windows. 
                                                       
1 The only paper we are familiar with that looks at tying or similar behavior used to enhance market power in 
durable-goods markets is Morita and Waldman (2003).  That paper, however, focuses on behavior analogous to a 
monopolist of a durable good tying a nondurable to the sale of the durable.  In contrast, our focus is on what happens 
when the tied good is also durable.  See Waldman (2003) for a general discussion of the durable-goods literature. 
  
2 A tie-in sale occurs when the seller of product A refuses to sell A to a consumer unless the consumer also 
purchases B.  Product A is referred to as the tying product and B as the tied product.  
 
3 A number of previous authors argued that a monopolist of a primary product never has an incentive to tie in order 
to monopolize a complementary product (see Director and Levi (1956), Bowman (1957), Posner (1976), and Bork 
(1978)).  Their argument was that the monopolist could capture all the potential monopoly profits through the 
primary-market monopoly.  Whinston’s analysis formalizes this argument but at the same time shows that it does not 
hold in all cases, i.e., where constant returns to scale and competition are lacking in the tied good and where the 
tying good is not essential (see also the earlier work of Ordover, Sykes, and Willig (1985)). 
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  One approach to solving this puzzle is to shift attention away from the creation of market power 
in the tied good and instead focus on the return that tying might have in either preserving its monopoly in 
the tying market or extending its primary-market monopoly to newly-emerging markets.4  We analyzed 
this possibility in Carlton and Waldman (2002) (see also Choi and Stefanidis (2001) and Nalebuff 
(2004)).  There we considered a series of models that show how a monopolist can use tying to both 
preserve and extend monopoly positions in the tying good.  For example, we considered models in which 
the alternative producer has a superior complementary product and in which the complementary market 
is characterized by either entry costs for the complementary good or network externalities.  The 
alternative producer has an incentive to enter the primary good market because by doing so it can capture 
more of the surplus associated with its superior complementary product.  What happens is that the 
monopolist ties and deters the alternative producer from entering the complementary market and this, in 
turn, reduces the incentive for subsequent entry into the primary market.  Moreover, in variants of the 
model, we showed how the initial monopolist can transfer his monopoly power to new products as 
technology changes.  We feel that these strategic uses of tying are some of the most important new 
lessons that economists can learn from studying Microsoft’s behavior (and IBM’s before it).   
  Our previous analysis formally shows how protecting its Windows monopoly can explain why 
Microsoft integrated Internet Explorer into Windows, but this reasoning is not a plausible explanation for 
all of  Microsoft’s tying decisions involving applications programs.  That is, technological conditions in 
the browser case are such that a successful rival browser has the potential to evolve into a substitute for 
Windows so our explanation of tying used to protect the primary-market monopoly is quite plausible.  
But technological conditions consistent with our argument do not hold generally for applications 
programs, so protecting the primary-market monopoly is not a general explanation for Microsoft’s tying 
decisions regarding applications programs.5   
  Given the inability of current theory to explain Microsoft’s tying decisions regarding 
applications programs, we reexamine the question initially considered by Whinston which is, under what 
circumstances will a monopolist of a primary product tie a complementary product in order to extend its 
                                                       
4 Another possibility is that Microsoft is responding to efficiency considerations.  See Evans and Salinger (2004) and 
Carlton and Perloff (2005) for discussions of efficiency rationales for tying. 
 
5 Gandal, Markovitch, and Riordan (2004) build on the classic analysis of Stigler (1963) concerning the negative 
correlation of values to provide an explanation for Microsoft’s bundling strategy in the PC office software market.  
But their argument would seem not to apply to the bundling of Windows and applications programs. 3 
monopoly to the tied market?  We show that, if products are durable and product upgrades and consumer 
switching costs are characteristics of the complementary product (two characteristics clearly associated 
with many of Microsoft’s applications programs), then a primary-good monopolist may indeed find it 
profitable to tie in order to monopolize a complementary market even when the primary product is 
essential for all uses of the complementary good.6  Whinston’s results on when tying is not profitable do 
not apply in our multi-period setting involving durable goods. 
  To understand the basic logic for our finding, we begin by reviewing the logic for Whinston’s 
finding that a monopolist will not tie if the primary product is essential for all uses of the complementary 
good.  Suppose the primary product is essential, the products are used in fixed proportions, marginal 
costs are constant, and consider a one-period setting.  Further, suppose for a moment that the alternative 
producer cannot enter the complementary market.  By setting the price for the complementary good at 
marginal cost and the price for the primary good at the optimal bundle price minus the complementary-
good price, the monopolist can sell individual products and earn the same profits as it can by tying.  
Given this, suppose the alternative producer has the option of entering the complementary market but not 
the primary market and further suppose the monopolist does not tie.  Since the monopolist can guarantee 
itself the profits associated with tying by setting the prices for the primary and complementary goods as 
before, if in equilibrium the alternative producer sells its complementary good this can only help 
monopoly profitability.  Hence, the monopolist has no incentive to tie. 
  In this paper we develop two separate analyses that show the above argument breaks down in the 
presence of durable goods with the result that tying can be profitable even though the monopolist’s 
primary good is essential for all uses of the complementary good.  In our first analysis there are identical 
consumers who are in the market for two periods, upgrades for the complementary good but no switching 
costs, the alternative producer has a superior complementary product, and the monopolist’s primary 
product is essential for all uses of the complementary good.  Suppose further that the monopolist sells its 
products.  Now the monopolist may tie in the first period not because this helps first-period profits 
(which cannot be the case given Whinston’s results), but because of an increase in second-period profits 
when upgrades are sold.  The logic here is that, because the alternative producer has a superior 
                                                       
6 There is an extensive literature that investigates models characterized by consumer switching costs.  Papers in this 
literature include Klemperer (1987,1989) and Farrell and Shapiro (1988,1989).  See Klemperer (1995) for a survey.  
There is also a literature concerning the upgrade process.  See, for example, Fudenberg and Tirole (1998) and related 
analyses in Waldman (1996) and Lee and Lee (1998).   4 
complementary product, in the absence of tying the alternative producer will typically sell 
complementary units in both periods while the monopolist will sell only the primary product in the first 
period.  This means monopoly profitability in the second period equals zero, i.e., the monopolist has 
limited ability to capture potential profits associated with the upgrade process.  As a result, if the benefit 
to upgrading is sufficiently high, then the monopolist will have an incentive to tie and stop the alternative 
producer from selling complementary units since the monopolist can then capture upgrade profits and in 
this way increase both second-period and overall profitability.   
  Our analysis reveals that an implicit assumption in Whinston’s analysis that shows that tying is 
not profitable when the tying good is essential is that all the relevant sales take place simultaneously.  
This is a perfectly reasonable assumption for many nondurable products, but for durables it is not 
realistic.   When all goods are sold simultaneously (and assuming the monopolist’s primary good is 
essential), the monopolist need not tie to capture all the potential monopoly profits because appropriately 
choosing the prices for the individual products ensures the firm does at least as well as with tying.  But 
this is not the case when some sales and thus some profits are realized in a later period.  In our analysis, 
because upgrades are sold in the second period, the monopolist has limited ability to capture profits 
associated with upgrading by selling individual products and simply choosing the appropriate first-period 
prices for these individual products.  Rather, if the firm sells its products and if second-period upgrade 
profits are large , the only way that the monopolist can capture all the profits associated with upgrading is 
by being the firm that sells the upgrades.  In turn, when the alternative producer’s complementary 
product is much superior to the monopolist’s, the only way for the monopolist to sell upgrades in the 
second period is for the firm to sell a tied product in the first.7 
  Our first analysis also provides a new explanation for leasing in durable-goods markets.8  That is, 
when we allow firms to lease as well as sell their products then we resurrect Whinston’s results that tying 
                                                       
7 An assumption of our analysis is that the monopolist cannot charge negative prices for the complementary product.  
We discuss the exact role of this assumption in detail in Section IV.  We also assume that the monopolist has limited 
ability to commit to future prices or write contracts with the alternative producer that bind future actions.  
Introducing such commitment ability would resurrect Whinston’s result that tying is not needed when the primary 
product is essential.  See the end of Section III for further discussion. 
 
8 There are a number of previous explanations for why durable-goods producers lease.  Examples include the time-
inconsistency argument of Coase (1972) and Bulow (1982), that leasing is used to remove lower quality used units 
from the market as in Waldman (1997) and Hendel and Lizzeri (1999), and that leasing is used to reduce problems 
due to adverse selection as shown in Hendel and Lizzeri (2002) and Johnson and Waldman (2003). 5 
is unimportant as long as the tying good is essential.  The reason is that in our first analysis the 
monopolist can capture second-period profits associated with upgrading by leasing and appropriately 
choosing second-period prices for its leased products. 
In our second analysis we continue with the same basic framework of our first analysis but now 
we add consumer switching costs for the complementary good, i.e., in the second period a consumer 
places a positive value on consuming the same “brand” of the complementary good that he consumed in 
the first period.  We show that introducing switching costs results in an even stronger motivation for the 
monopolist to tie in the sense that there are now parameterizations in which the monopolist ties not only 
in the case of selling but also in the case of leasing.  The logic is that, if the alternative producer leases or 
sells complementary units in the first period, then the second-period benefits due to the switching costs 
are associated only with the alternative producer’s complementary good.  This means the monopolist 
cannot ensure that it will capture these benefits by marketing its products individually, leasing, and 
choosing appropriate prices.  The result is that, if second-period upgrade and switching-cost profits are 
both high, then the monopolist ties in order to capture the extra second-period consumer benefits 
associated with an individual upgrading and consuming the same brand he consumed in the first period.   
We also consider a number of extensions including the issue of reversible versus irreversible ties, 
i.e., when the monopolist ties does a consumer of the monopolist’s product have the ability to use the 
alternative producer’s complementary product (a reversible tie) or is this not feasible (an irreversible tie).  
We show that whether or not ties are reversible is critical for understanding whether or not tying will be 
used in the types of settings considered in our analysis.  The returns to tying that we identify hold in the 
case of irreversible ties.  When ties are reversible, in contrast, then tying is equivalent to setting the price 
of the complementary good to zero so there is no incremental return to the act of either contractually or 
physically tying the products.  We relate this result to Microsoft’s behavior in the design of Windows. 
The outline for the paper is as follows.  Section II considers a model characterized by upgrades 
but no switching costs and shows that tying can be optimal when firms sell as opposed to lease their 
products.  Section III enriches the analysis in Section II by incorporating switching costs and shows that 
tying can be optimal in the case of selling or leasing.  Section IV considers various extensions of our 
analysis including what happens when ties are reversible and when there are upgrades for both the 
primary and complementary goods.  Section V discusses the antitrust implications of our analysis.  
Section VI presents some concluding remarks.    6 
II. TYING IN THE PRESENCE OF COMPLEMENTARY-GOOD UPGRADES 
In this section we analyze what happens when there are upgrades for the complementary product 
but no switching costs.  Our focus will be on showing that, if the monopolist is restricted to selling its 
products, then the monopolist sometimes ties in order to capture potential profits associated with the 
upgrade process.  However, we also show that tying is not useful if leasing is possible, thereby providing 
a new rationale for leasing.  In the following section we consider how the results change when switching 
costs are added to the model. 
 
A) The Model 
  We consider a two-period setting in which the monopolist is the sole producer in the primary 
market in both periods, say due to patenting, where the monopolist has a constant marginal cost for 
producing the primary good, denoted cp.  There is a complementary good that can be produced by the 
monopolist and a single other firm, where the monopolist and this alternative producer have the same 
constant marginal cost for producing the complementary good, denoted cc.  However, as described in 
more detail below, the alternative producer’s complementary product is of higher quality than the 
monopolist’s complementary product.  Both primary and complementary products are durable so a unit 
purchased in the first period can be used in both periods, and the firms engage in Bertrand competition 
when more than one firm is active.    
  At the beginning of the second period each firm has the option of investing R and then selling 
higher quality complementary units in the second period (we discuss the possibility of primary-good 
upgrades in Section IV).  Each of the N identical consumers receives a positive benefit from consuming a 
system where a system consists of one primary unit and one complementary unit, while no benefit is 
received from consuming either a primary unit by itself or a complementary unit by itself.9  To be 
precise, in the first period a consumer derives a gross benefit from a system in which the complementary 
good is produced by the monopolist equal to VM, while his gross benefit from a system in which the 
complementary good is produced by the alternative producer is VA, where VA>VM captures that the 
alternative producer’s complementary product is higher quality.  We also assume 2VM>cp+cc to ensure 
                                                       
9 Because our models are characterized by identical consumers and each individual consumes either zero or one unit 
of each good in each period, the Coase time-inconsistency problem concerning durable-goods markets does not arise.  
See Coase (1972) and Bulow (1982) for analyses of this issue. 
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that production is profitable in this setting (note that this is the correct condition both because the 
primary and complementary products are durable and as indicated below there is no discounting). 
  If an individual consumes a system in the second period that contains the monopolist’s 
complementary product, then he receives VM if it is not an upgraded product and VM+￿ if it is upgraded, 
where N￿>R+Ncc (N￿>R+Ncc means that upgrading is efficient).  On the other hand, if an individual 
consumes a system in the second period that contains the alternative producer’s complementary product, 
then he receives VA if it is not an upgraded product and VA+￿ if it is.  In this specification ￿ is the return 
to consuming an upgraded product.10  
  In the beginning of the first period the monopolist decides whether to offer a tied product 
consisting of one unit of its primary and complementary goods or whether to offer the products 
individually.11  Following Whinston (1990), we begin by assuming ties are irreversible which simply 
means that if the two goods are tied, a consumer cannot undo the tie.  That is, if a consumer purchases a 
tied good consisting of one unit of the monopolist’s primary good and one unit of its complementary 
good, then the consumer cannot add a unit of the alternative producer’s complementary good to the 
system.  As a result, if the monopolist offers a tied product, then the alternative producer does not sell 
any complementary units.  We investigate the significance of this assumption in Section IV.12  Note, 
however, if the monopolist ties in the first period and upgrades its complementary good in the second 
period, then a consumer who purchased the monopolist’s tied product in the first period can add the  
upgraded product to his system in the second period. 
  Finally, to complete the set-up of the model, we adopt the following assumptions.  First, to keep 
the analysis easy to follow we assume no discounting by either firms or consumers.  Second, if a 
consumer purchases a complementary unit in the first period and then purchases an upgraded 
                                                       
10 As indicated, we assume that the upgrade value is the same for each firm.  This is not important for our findings, 
but rather simplifies the exposition. 
 
11 There is no reason for the monopolist in the first period to offer both tied and individual products in this model 
because consumers are identical rather than heterogeneous.  See Adams and Yellen (1976) for an analysis in which 
consumers are heterogeneous and firms sometimes offer both tied and individual products to more effectively price 
discriminate. 
 
12 From a real-world perspective, when a firm commits to bundle its products the resulting system can either be 
incompatible with the alternative producer’s product or compatible with the alternative producer’s product.  The 
former case is what we mean when we say that consumers cannot undo ties, while we refer to the latter case as 
consumers being able to undo ties. 8 
complementary unit in the second period, the used complementary good has no scrap value and there is 
no secondhand market on which to sell the used good.13  Third, following Fudenberg and Tirole (1998) 
we allow a firm selling upgrades in the second period to price discriminate.  That is, the firm has the 
ability to charge one price to consumers who are upgrading a used unit of the producer’s complementary 
product and a different price to those who did not previously consume a complementary unit produced by 
the firm.14  Fourth, we restrict attention to Pure-Strategy Subgame-Perfect Nash equilibria.15 
  The timing of the decisions is as follows.  The first period consists of three stages.  First, the 
monopolist chooses whether to have tied or individual products. Second, the firms simultaneuously 
choose prices for their products and whether or not to sell or lease when leasing is an option, where we 
restrict all prices to be non-negative.16  Third, consumers then simultaneously choose which products to 
purchase (or lease when products are offered for lease).  The second period then consists of three stages.  
First, the firms simultaneously choose whether to invest R and upgrade their complementary products.  
Second, the firms simultaneously choose prices for their products.  Third, consumers simultaneously 
choose which products to purchase (or lease when products are offered for lease). 
 
B) Selling Only 
  In this subsection we analyze the model under the assumption that firms are restricted to selling  
rather than leasing their products.  Our main result is that, if firms are restricted to selling their products, 
then the introduction of upgrades makes tying a valuable tool for the monopolist.  In particular, the 
                                                       
13 Introducing a secondhand market would not change any of the results because of our assumption that all 
consumers are identical.  Similarly, introducing a positive scrap value would not substantially change our results. 
 
14 The firm can enforce this type of pricing either if the firm knows who bought its complementary product in the 
first period, or by offering a lower price in the second period for the upgraded complementary good for those who 
offer a used unit of the firm’s complementary product as a trade-in.  Imposing this assumption means, for example, 
that a consumer in equilibrium never delays purchasing the alternative producer’s complementary product to the 
second period in order to take advantage of a low second-period price for the upgraded product.  Also, we do not 
allow pricing for the primary product to be contingent on the consumption of a rival’s product. 
 
15 We also restrict the analysis to symmetric equilibria, i.e., equilibria in which each of the N identical consumers 
employs the same equilibrium strategy. 
 
16 We assume the monopolist either sells both products or leases both products, i.e., we do not allow the monopolist, 
for example, to sell the primary good and lease the complementary good.  This is not important for our results but it 
simplifies the analysis.  Also, without loss of generality, we assume that a firm’s first-period decision concerning 
selling or leasing is also binding for the second period.  This entails no loss of generality because in our model there 
is no real difference between selling and leasing in the second period. 9 
monopolist chooses to tie when the incremental benefit associated with upgrading and the extra quality 
associated with the alternative producer’s superior complementary product are both sufficiently high.   
  We begin with a benchmark analysis in which there are no upgrades, i.e., l=0.  Our argument in 
this benchmark case is closely related to Whinston’s first analysis of tying and complementary goods.  In 
that analysis Whinston considers a setting in which, as in our model, all uses of the complementary good 
require the primary good, and shows that the monopolist has no incentive to tie because the monopolist is 
actually helped when the alternative producer enters the complementary market.  We show that the same 
result holds in our model in the absence of upgrades.  Let pm denotes monopoly profitability in 
equilibrium while pm* denotes monopoly profitability in the absence of an alternative producer.  Then the 
following proposition is true.   
 
Proposition 1: Suppose firms sell their products and l=0.  Then there are multiple equilibria, where in 
one equilibrium the monopolist ties while in the other equilibria it does not.  In the equilibrium in which 
the monopolist ties pm=pm*, while every equilibrium in which the monopolist sells individual products is 
such that pm³pm* (where some of these equilibria are such that pm>pm*). 
 
  Proposition 1 tells us that, in the absence of upgrades, the monopolist cannot increase its 
profitability by tying.  That is, although there is an equilibrium in which the monopolist ties, this is not 
because the monopolist increases its profits by tying.  As the proposition states, monopoly profitability in 
every equilibrium in which the firm sells individual products is at least as high as what the firm receives 
when it ties.  Rather, in the tying equilibrium the monopolist is indifferent between tying and not tying 
because in that equilibrium it anticipates that, if it were to sell individual products, then its profitability 
would be the same as with tying.   
  The logic for this finding is the same as Whinston’s argument referred to above.  Suppose for a 
moment that the alternative producer cannot sell complementary units.  By setting the price for the 
complementary good at marginal cost and the price for the primary good at the optimal bundle price 
minus the complementary-good price, the monopolist can sell individual products and earn the same 
profits as it can by tying.  Given this, suppose the alternative producer has the option of selling 
complementary units and the monopolist does not tie.  Since the monopolist can guarantee itself the 
profits associated with tying by setting the prices for the primary and complementary goods as before, it 10 
follows that if the alternative producer sells its complementary good this cannot hurt monopoly 
profitability.  Hence, in this case the monopolist may hurt profitability and cannot help profitability by 
tying.  Or a simpler way to put this is that, if ￿=0, then all transactions occur in the first period.  In turn, 
since all sales occur simultaneously, then Whinston’s logic applies. 
  One final comment about this first proposition concerns the idea that tying can actually hurt the 
monopolist in this initial setting.  If the monopolist does not tie, then there are multiple equilibria many 
of which are characterized by consumers in the first period purchasing the primary good from the 
monopolist and the complementary good from the alternative producer.  What varies across these 
equilibria is how the surplus associated with the alternative producer’s superior complementary product 
is shared between the monopolist and the alternative producer.  Any sharing rule between all the surplus 
being received by the monopolist and all being received by the alternative producer is possible.  In a 
tying equilibrium the monopolist anticipates that if it sold individual products then it would not receive 
as profits any of the alternative producer’s surplus, so tying does not hurt (but also does not help) the 
monopolist.  There are, however, equilibria in which the monopolist does not tie and receives some of 
this surplus.  In these equilibria the monopolist does not tie because it anticipates that tying would hurt 
profitability.  
  We now consider what happens when upgrades are introduced, i.e., l is sufficiently large that 
upgrading occurs in equilibrium.  This case works quite differently from the benchmark case analyzed 
above.  The reason is that, as opposed to what is true when upgrades are not possible, the monopolist can 
no longer sell individual products and guarantee itself profits at least as high as under tying.  The logic 
here is that with upgrades some profits are realized in the second period rather than in the first and the 
monopolist sometimes cannot fully capture those profits unless it is the firm that sells upgrades in the 
second period.   
  We begin our analysis of this case by considering behavior in period 2 as a function of what 
happens in period 1.  We partially characterize this behavior in Lemma 1.17 
                                                       
17 Below we focus on what happens when consumers in the first period purchase the monopolist’s primary product 
and the alternative producer’s complementary product.  Another interesting case is what happens if in the first period 
consumers purchase the monopolist’s primary and complementary products.  Then, if both firms upgrade, consumers 
purchase the alternative producer’s complementary product at a price (VA-VM)+cc.  On the other hand, if only the 
alternative producer upgrades, then consumers purchase the alternative producer’s complementary product at a price 
(VA-VM)+￿, while if only the monopolist upgrades then second-period behavior depends on the relative magnitudes 
of ￿, VA-VM, and cc.  11 
Lemma 1:  Suppose that all consumers in the first period purchase the monopolist’s primary good and the 
alternative producer’s complementary good.  Holding all other parameters fixed, there exists a value VA* 
such that if VA>VA*, then i), ii), and iii) characterize what happens in period 2.   
  i) Only the alternative producer invests R and upgrades its complementary product. 
  ii) All consumers purchase the upgraded complementary product from the alternative producer at  
     a price l. 
  iii) The alternative producer earns second-period profits equal to N(l-cc)-R while the  
      monopolist’s second-period profits equal zero.  
 
  Lemma 1 tells us that, if the alternative producer’s quality advantage in the complementary 
product is sufficiently large and the alternative producer sold complementary units in the first period, 
then only the alternative producer will upgrade and sell complementary units in the second period.  The 
logic here is as follows.  If both firms invest R and upgrade their products, because the alternative 
producer has a superior complementary product, the alternative producer will sell complementary units in 
the second period at a price equal to min{l, (VA-VM)+cc}.  Given our assumption that N￿>R+Ncc, this 
means that if VA is sufficiently high, then the alternative producer will invest R and sell upgraded 
complementary units in the second period whether or not it anticipates that the monopolist will upgrade.  
In turn, since the monopolist knows this, in equilibrium only the alternative producer will choose to 
invest R and upgrade which means the firm will sell its upgraded product at a price of l in the second 
period.   
  The reason this result is important is that it indicates that the logic behind Proposition 1 does not 
hold when upgrading occurs.  In the absence of upgrading, the monopolist could sell individual products 
and price in such a way that it guarantees itself profits at least as high as with tying.  But this is not true 
when upgrades are possible.  Suppose the monopolist sells individual products and the alternative 
producer sells complementary units in the first period.  Then in the first period the monopolist receives 
some share of the value associated with the alternative producer’s superior complementary product, but 
in the second period the monopolist earns zero while the alternative producer receives N(l-cc)-R.  On the 
other hand, if the monopolist ties, then it gives up any potential sharing of the surplus associated with the 
alternative producer’s superior complementary product but in the second period it earns N(l-cc)-R.  
Given this, if N(l-cc)-R is sufficiently large, the conclusion is that the monopolist must earn higher 12 
profits by tying than by selling individual products and allowing the alternative producer to sell 
complementary units in the first period.  This logic is expressed formally in Proposition 2 in which W 
denotes social welfare in equilibrium while W
N denotes welfare if the monopolist is restricted not to tie. 
 
Proposition 2: Suppose firms sell as opposed to lease their products.  Holding all other parameters fixed, 
if VA>VA* and l is sufficiently large, then there is a unique equilibrium characterized by i) through iv).18 
  i) The monopolist sells a tied product to all consumers in the first period. 
  ii) The monopolist invests R at the beginning of the second period and sells an upgraded  
       complementary product to all consumers in the second period at a price of ￿. 
  iii) The alternative producer does not sell complementary units in either period and does not  
        invest R in the second period. 
  iv) W<W
N. 
   
  An interesting aspect of Proposition 2 is that, when l is sufficiently large, tying is preferred by 
the monopolist to selling individual products and setting the price for the complementary good at zero.  
The problem with the latter strategy is that it does not stop the alternative producer from selling 
complementary units in the first period and thus, in turn, being the seller of upgrades in the second 
period.  Both because the alternative producer has a superior complementary good and because it will sell 
second-period upgrades if its sells complementary units in the first period, in response to a price of zero 
charged by the monopolist for the complementary good the alternative producer may choose to price 
sufficiently low that it sells complementary units in the first period.  Even if this results in first-period 
losses for the alternative producer, this can be profitable for the alternative producer because of the 
subsequent profits the firm earns in the second period when it sells upgrades.  Hence, when a zero price 
for the complementary good by the monopolist does not stop the alternative producer from selling 
complementary units, the monopolist may find that it maximizes profits by tying (in Section IV we 
discuss how the analysis changes when we relax the assumption that prices need to be non-negative).19 
                                                       
18 Without assuming VA>VA* we are not assured of a unique equilibrium.  If ￿ is large but VA<VA*, then there is 
always an equilibrium characterized by i) through iv) but it need not be unique. 
 
19 One important assumption both here and in the next section is that research and development is costly, i.e., R>0.  
If R=0, then both here and in the next section there would be no reason for the monopolist to tie.  The reason is that 13 
  Another interesting aspect of Proposition 2 is that, as captured in iv) of the proposition, the act of 
tying reduces welfare.  The logic is straightforward.  As described, when the monopolist ties the result is 
that all consumers purchase primary and complementary units from the monopolist in the first period and 
then upgraded complementary units from the monopolist in the second period.  Suppose instead the 
monopolist was not able to tie because of government regulation.  Then all consumers would purchase 
primary units from the monopolist in the first period, complementary units from the alternative producer 
in the first period, and upgraded complementary units from the alternative producer in the second period.  
From a social-welfare standpoint the only difference between the two cases is that in the tying case 
consumers purchase the monopolist’s lower quality complementary units rather than the alternative 
producer’s higher quality complementary units.  Given this, the act of tying clearly reduces welfare. 
 
C) Selling and Leasing 
  We now turn our attention to what happens when firms can lease as well as sell their products.  
This analysis provides a new rationale for leasing.  The reason the model works differently when leasing 
is an option is because, even without tying, by leasing its primary and complementary goods the 
monopolist provides itself with second-period prices from which it can extract profits due to upgrading.  
We formally consider this case in Proposition 3. 
 
Proposition 3: Suppose firms can lease as well as sell their products in the presence of upgrades.  For 
every allowable parameterization there are two equilibria characterized by the monopolist tying (in one it 
sells its products and in the other it leases) and in each ￿M=￿M*.  There are also other equilibria in which 
the monopolist markets its products individually and every such equilibrium satisfies ￿M￿￿M* (where 
some of these equilibria are such that ￿M>￿M*). 
 
  Proposition 3 tells us that when leasing is an option the monopolist no longer has an incentive to 
tie even in the presence of upgrades.  The result here is similar to what was found in Proposition 1.  That 
is, although there are equilibria in which the monopolist ties, this is not because monopoly profitability is 
higher with tying.  Rather, as was true in the analysis of Proposition 1, monopoly profitability in any 
                                                                                                                                                                           
with R=0 the monopolist’s second-period complementary product is automatically upgraded, so the alternative 
producer’s second-period profit would only reflect the superiority of its product rather than the upgrade value. 14 
equilibrium in which the monopolist does not tie is at least as high and sometimes higher than in the 
tying cases.  To be more precise, whenever the monopolist ties the firm is indifferent between tying and 
an alternative strategy in which it markets its products individually and earns the same profits as in the 
tying cases. 
  The logic here is a two-period variant of the logic in Whinston’s paper described earlier.  
Suppose that in the first period the monopolist leases its products individually, charges marginal cost for 
its complementary good, and sets the primary-good price equal to the optimal first-period price for a 
leased bundle consisting of its primary and complementary goods minus the complementary-good price.  
This first-period strategy ensures first-period profits at least as high as first-period profits associated with 
leasing and tying.  Now suppose that in the second period the monopolist upgrades its complementary 
good and then employs the same pricing strategy, i.e., the upgraded complementary good is priced at 
marginal cost and the price of the primary good is set equal to the optimal second-period price for a 
leased bundle consisting of primary and complementary goods minus the price of the upgraded 
complementary good.  This ensures second-period profits at least as high as second-period profits 
associated with leasing and tying.  Since tying yields the same profits whether or not the firm sells or 
leases, we now have that whenever tying is observed the firm could have done at least equally well by 
marketing its products individually. 
  An interesting aspect of this result is that, in contrast to tying, by leasing here the monopolist is 
able to capture second-period upgrade profits and also possibly share in the surplus associated with the 
alternative producer’s superior complementary product.  To see this, consider a parameterization in 
which ￿ is sufficiently large that, consistent with Proposition 2, the monopolist would tie if it was 
restricted to selling its products.  For such a parameterization, if leasing is possible, then there are 
equilibria in which the monopolist leases individual products rather than ties.  In some of these equilibria 
monopoly profitability is the same as with tying which means that the monopolist does not share in the 
surplus associated with the alternative producer’s superior complementary product.  But there are other 
equilibria in which the monopolist leases, does not tie, and profitability is higher than under tying.  In 
these equilibria the monopolist both captures the second-period profit associated with upgrading and a 
positive share of the surplus associated with the alternative producer’s superior complementary good. 
  What does Proposition 3 imply about social welfare?  Let W* be social welfare in the absence of 
the alternative producer.  In each tying equilibrium W=W* since tying means that the alternative 15 
producer is not able to sell or lease its complementary product.  Further, in an equilibrium in which the 
monopolist markets its products individually and ￿M>￿M*, then W>W* (if ￿M=￿M*, then W￿W*).  The 
logic here is that, in the absence of an alternative producer, the monopolist extracts all the surplus, or, 
equivalently, both consumers and the alternative producer receive zero surplus.  So, when ￿M>￿M*, the 
monopolist is better off while consumers and the alternative producer are no worse off, so social welfare 
must be higher. 
  In summary, in this section we have shown that a primary-good monopolist sometimes has an 
incentive to tie in a world in which the monopolist sells its products and there are upgrades for the 
complementary good.  The rationale is that, in the absence of tying, the monopolist has limited ability to 
capture the value consumers place on the upgrade.  Hence, if the upgrade is sufficiently valuable, then 
the monopolist may tie in order to capture those upgrade profits.  The analysis also provides a new reason 
for why such a firm might lease but not tie since leasing is an alternative way for the firm to capture 
upgrade profits, and, in fact, in some cases leasing without tying will be preferred because it allows the 
firm to both capture upgrade profits and some of the profits due to the alternative producer’s superior 
complementary product.  
 
III. TYING IN THE PRESENCE OF UPGRADES AND SWITCHING COSTS 
  In this section we investigate how the analysis changes when consumer switching costs are 
introduced.  Our main finding is that tying can now be optimal even if the primary-good monopolist has 
the option of leasing as well as selling its products.  The reason is that, if consumer switching costs are 
substantial and individuals consume the alternative producer’s complementary product in the first period, 
then in the second period the monopolist’s upgraded complementary good becomes a less attractive 
substitute for the alternative producer’s upgraded product and this limits the monopolist’s ability to 
capture second-period profits due to the switching costs through leasing. 
 
A) The Model 
  We now add consumer switching costs to the model.  To understand what this means in our 
model, suppose that each firm upgrades at the beginning of the second period.  Then an individual who 
consumes a unit of the monopolist’s complementary good in the first period will have a higher valuation 
for the monopolist’s upgrade in the second period than will an individual who consumed the alternative 16 
producer’s complementary good in the first period (an analogous statement holds for a consumer of the 
alternative producer’s complementary product in the first period).  One interpretation for the switching 
cost here is that the complementary product is associated with learning-by-doing.  For example, if a 
consumer initially learned word processing using Word 2002 rather than Word Perfect 11, then he will 
typically prefer Word 2003 over Word Perfect 12 because of the similar ways in which Word 2002 and 
Word 2003 operate. 
  To be precise, the gross benefits that consumers receive in the second period from various 
consumption combinations are different than in the model of the previous section.  Consider first an 
individual who consumed a system containing the monopolist’s complementary good in the first period.  
If the individual consumes a system in the second period that contains the monopolist’s complementary 
product, then he receives VM+￿ if it is not an upgraded product and VM+￿+￿ if it is upgraded, where 
￿>0.  On the other hand, if the individual consumes a system in the second period that contains the 
alternative producer’s complementary product, then he receives VA if it is not an upgraded product and 
VA+￿ if it is.  In this specification ￿ captures the switching costs, i.e., the consumer receives an added 
benefit if he consumes the same brand of the complementary product in the second period as in the first, 
while as before ￿ is the return to consuming an upgraded product. 
  Now consider an individual who consumed a system containing the alternative producer’s 
complementary good in the first period.  This case is symmetric to the one above.  If the individual 
consumes a system in the second period that contains the alternative producer’s complementary product, 
then he receives VA+￿ if it is not an upgraded product and VA+￿+￿ if it is.  On the other hand, if the 
individual consumes a system in the second period that contains the monopolist’s complementary 
product, then he receives VM if it is not an upgraded product and VM+￿ if it is.20 
  The other change that we introduce concerns how prices are determined.  In the model under 
consideration, when the monopolist does not tie Bertrand competition does not typically result in a 
unique set of prices.21  For example, suppose both firms lease, all consumers in the first period lease the 
                                                       
20 As indicated, we assume that the switching cost value is the same for each firm.  As is true for the similar 
assumption for the upgrade value (see footnote 10), this is not important for our findings but rather simplifies the 
exposition. 
 
21 In terms of second-period prices which is our focus in terms of avoiding the multiplicity of prices, the problem 
only arises when the monopolist leases its products.  Note that this multiplicity problem was also present in the 
previous analysis but there resolving the problem was not necessary for showing the return to tying. 17 
alternative producer’s complementary product, and both firms upgrade their complementary product at 
the beginning of the second period.  Given this, consider pricing in the second period.  One equilibrium 
set of second-period prices is that the monopolist charges VM+￿-cc for its primary product and the 
alternative producer charges (VA-VM)+￿+cc for its upgraded complementary product (here and in the 
following set of equilibrium prices, consumers lease the complementary good from the alternative 
producer as long as the monopolist charges more than cc for its complementary product).  In this 
equilibrium to the second-period pricing subgame, the alternative producer receives all of the surplus 
associated with consumers preferring its version of the upgraded complementary product.  However, in 
another set of equilibrium second-period prices, the monopolist charges VA+￿+￿-cc for its primary 
product and the alternative producer charges cc for its upgraded complementary product.  In this 
equilibrium to the second-period pricing subgame, the monopolist receives all of the surplus associated 
with consumers preferring the alternative producer’s version of the complementary good.  In fact, any 
division across the two sellers is consistent with equilibrium. 
  Following the approach we took in Carlton and Waldman (2002), we assume that when this 
indeterminacy problem arises in the second period the prices that emerge evenly divide across the two 
sellers the surplus associated with consumers preferring the alternative producer’s version of the 
complementary good (one interpretation of our assumption that the surplus is divided equally between 
the firms is that prices are determined by the Nash bargaining solution - see Nash (1950)).  The same 
qualitative results would follow from any division that gave the alternative producer a strictly positive 
proportion of the surplus.  If, on the other hand, the monopolist received all of the surplus, then when it 
can lease there would be no incentive for the monopolist to tie because leasing by itself would allow the 
firm to capture all the value associated with the consumer switching costs.22  
 
B) Analysis 
  If firms are restricted to selling their products, then the results here are similar to the results of 
the previous section.  First, if the alternative producer’s complementary product is sufficiently superior, 
                                                       
22 We now also restrict the analysis to parameterizations for which N(￿-cc)/2>R.  Given our assumption concerning 
how the second-period multiple equilibria problem concerning prices is resolved this restriction ensures that, if 
consumers in the first period lease the monopolist’s primary good and the alternative producer’s complementary 
good, the alternative producer upgrades in the second period when the switching cost is sufficiently high.  This 
assumption serves to reduce the number of cases that need to be considered. 18 
then in the absence of the monopolist tying the alternative producer sells a complementary product in the 
first period and an upgraded complementary product in the second period.  Second, in this situation the 
alternative producer earns second-period profits that are a linearly increasing function of the quality 
improvement due to upgrading, i.e., ￿.  Third, because of the limited ability of the monopolist to capture 
these second-period profits through the first-period sale of the primary good, if ￿ is sufficiently large then 
the monopolist ties and directly captures these second-period profits.  Fourth, because tying forecloses a 
superior complementary product, for these parameterizations the act of tying reduces social welfare. 
  We now turn our attention to what happens when firms can either sell or lease their products.  
We begin with a preliminary result concerning what happens in the second period when in the first period 
all consumers lease primary units from the monopolist and complementary units from the alternative 
producer.  Note that in the analysis of second-period behavior there is a potential multiple equilibria 
problem concerning the R&D decision.  Similar to our analysis in Lemma 1 concerning what happens in 
the second period when firms only sell their output, we restrict the analysis in Lemma 2 to 
parameterizations in which the alternative producer’s complementary product is sufficiently superior in 
period 2 that this multiple equilibria problem does not arise. 
 
Lemma 2: Suppose that all consumers in the first period lease the monopolist’s primary good and the 
alternative producer’s complementary good.  Holding all other parameters fixed, if ￿ is sufficiently large,  
then i) through iv) characterize what happens in the second period.  
  i) Both firms invest R and upgrade. 
  ii) All consumers lease a primary unit from the monopolist and an upgraded complementary unit  
      from the alternative producer. 
  iii) The price for the monopolist’s primary unit is VM+￿-cc+[(VA-VM+￿)/2], while the price for  
       the alternative producer’s complementary unit is cc+[(VA-VM+￿)/2].23 
  iv) The monopolist’s second-period profits equal N[VM+￿-cc+[(VA-VM+￿)/2]-R, while the  
       alternative producer’s profits equal N[(VA-VM+￿)/2]-R. 
   
                                                       
23 The sum of the price of the monopolist’s primary unit and the price of the alternative producer’s upgraded 
complementary unit is VA+￿+￿, i.e., the gross benefit received by an individual consuming a system consisting of the 
monopolist’s primary good and the alternative producer’s upgraded complementary good.  19 
  Lemma 2 gives us a number of results concerning what happens in the second period when firms 
offer to lease rather than sell their products and in the first period consumers lease primary units from the 
monopolist and complementary units from the alternative producer.  First, if the switching cost is 
sufficiently large, then there is a unique equilibrium in which both firms upgrade and consumers lease 
primary units from the monopolist and upgraded complementary units from the alternative producer.  
Note that the return here for the monopolist to upgrade even though it does not sell upgraded 
complementary units in the second period is that upgrading allows the monopolist to raise the lease price 
for the primary product and in this way capture all of ￿.24  Second, abstracting from the upgrade cost, the 
monopolist captures all of the profits due to the improved upgrade quality.  Third, even though the 
monopolist upgrades, its second-period profit is such that the monopolist captures only half of the 
second-period profit due to the switching cost while the other half is captured by the alternative producer.  
  It is the second and third results that we want to focus on.  The second result is an example of the 
main point of Proposition 3 of the previous section.  That is, when the monopolist leases in the first 
period, it always has the option in the second period of upgrading its complementary unit and in this way 
capturing the second-period profits due to the increased upgrade quality.  As a result, as captured in 
Proposition 3 of the previous section, if there are upgrades but no switching costs and the monopolist has 
the option of leasing, then it never has an incentive to tie because it can use a leasing strategy to capture 
the profits due to upgrading and thus marketing its products individually does at least as well as tying. 
  The third result described above tells us that in terms of second-period behavior the model works 
quite differently for switching costs than it does for the quality improvement due to the complementary-
good upgrade.  As just described, the monopolist can capture all of the second-period profits due to the 
upgrade process by leasing and upgrading in the second period.  In contrast, even when the monopolist 
upgrades, Lemma 2.iii) and 2.iv) tell us that if in the first period consumers lease the monopolist’s 
primary good and the alternative producer’s complementary good, then second-period prices are such 
that the monopolist only captures half of the second-period profits due to the switching costs.  Note, 
however, that if the monopolist ties (whether or not it leases or sells its tied product), the monopolist 
captures all of the second-period profits due to the switching costs.  The result is that, if the switching 
                                                       
24 If we interpret second-period prices as being determined by Nash bargaining, then by upgrading the monopolist 
improves its second-period threat point. 20 
cost is sufficiently large, then the monopolist may have an incentive to tie.  This logic is expressed 
formally in Proposition 4. 
 
Proposition 4: Suppose firms can either sell or lease their products.  Holding all other parameters fixed, if 
￿ and ￿ are both sufficiently large, then i) through v) characterize equilibrium behavior. 
  i) The monopolist either sells or leases a tied product to all consumers in the first period.  
  ii) The monopolist invests R at the beginning of the second period. 
  iii) If the monopolist sold (leased) a tied product in the first period, then it sells an upgraded  
       complementary good to all consumers in the second period (leases a tied good consisting of a  
       primary unit and an upgraded complementary unit to all consumers in the second period). 
  iv) The alternative producer does not sell or lease complementary units in either period and does  
       not invest R in the second period. 
  v) If 2N(VA-VM)>R, then W<W
N.  
 
  In Whinston’s (1990) classic analysis the monopolist never ties when its primary good is 
essential for all uses of the complementary good.  Whinston considers a one-period setting and shows 
that the monopolist never ties when its primary product is essential because it can sell its products 
individually and set the prices for its products so that it is guaranteed at least the same profits as it earns 
by tying.  Proposition 2 shows that this result is not robust to the introduction of durable goods, upgrades, 
and a selling-only policy, but Proposition 3 shows that it is if leasing is allowed.  Proposition 4 shows 
that this result is not robust to the introduction of durable goods, upgrades, and switching costs even 
when the monopolist has the option of leasing. 
  What underlied Proposition 3 is that, if we were to take as fixed the value in each period that 
consumers have for the various products, then by leasing individual products and upgrading, the 
monopolist can guarantee itself in each period the same profits as it earns by tying.  But this logic does 
not eliminate the incentive to tie in the presence of consumer switching costs.  The reason is that, if the 
monopolist leases, upgrades in the second period, and the alternative producer leases or sells 
complementary units in the first period, then because of the switching costs in the second period the 
monopolist’s complementary product is perceived by the first-period consumers of the alternative 
producer’s complementary good to be lower in value than if the monopolist had leased or sold a tied 21 
product in the first period.  The result is that the monopolist’s second-period profit is not guaranteed to 
be as high as if it leased a tied unit in each period, and if the switching cost is sufficiently high this logic 
translates into an incentive for the monopolis to tie. 
  To be more precise, suppose the monopolist leases, does not tie, and upgrades in the second 
period.  If consumers lease the alternative producer’s complementary product in the first period and the 
alternative producer upgrades in the second period, our assumption that the surplus in the second period 
is split evenly across the firms means the monopolist’s second-period profit equals N(VM+￿-cc)-R 
+N((VA-VM+￿)/2).  In contrast, by tying, leasing, and upgrading, the monopolist achieves second-period 
profit equal to N(VM+￿+￿-cc)-R.  In other words, tying allows the monopolist to capture all the second-
period value due to the switching costs but none of the value due to the alternative producer’s superior 
complementary product, while not tying and having individuals in the first period consume the alternative 
producer’s complementary product means that in the second period the monopolist captures half of the 
value due to both switching costs and the alternative producer’s superior complementary product.  If ￿ is 
sufficiently large, the tying outcome is preferred.   
  One interesting aspect of Proposition 4 is that both ￿ and ￿ have to be large to ensure that tying 
is employed.  From the discussion in the above paragraph, one might think that only ￿ needs to be large 
to ensure tying is employed.  But the above paragraph assumes that, if the monopolist does not tie, its 
alternative strategy is to lease.  But this is not necessarily the case.  It is possible that the monopolist’s 
best alternative strategy is to sell its products rather than lease.  Further, one can show that, if the 
monopolist’s best alternative is to sell rather than lease, then it is possible that it is able to capture much 
of the value of the second-period switching cost through the first-period sale of the primary product.  But 
from Proposition 2 we know that, if the monopolist sells, then its profitability is lower than tying 
profitability if ￿ is sufficiently large.  Hence, if ￿ and ￿ are both sufficiently large, then the monopolist 
must maximize its profits by tying. 
  Another interesting aspect of Proposition 4 is that, in contrast to what was true in Proposition 2, 
tying used to monopolize the complementary market does not always hurt social welfare.  If, in the 
absence of the ability to tie, the monopolist would sell its products, then as in Proposition 2 tying can 
only hurt social welfare.  However, if the absence of tying means the monopolist leases, then tying can in 
fact improve social welfare.  The logic here is as follows.  For some parameterizations, if the monopolist 
is restricted not to tie, then it leases, both firms upgrade, and individuals in the second period consume 22 
the monopolist’s primary product and the alternative producer’s complementary product (as noted before, 
the monopolist upgrades because this reduces the surplus associated with the alternative producer’s 
complementary product which, in turn, increases the second-period price for the monopolist’s primary 
good).25  For these parameterizations, tying has two effects on social welfare.  The first is that there is a 
social welfare cost equal to 2N(VA-VM) because individuals consume the monopolist’s lower quality 
complementary product, but there is also a social-welfare benefit equal to R because only the monopolist 
invests.  In these parameterizations, social welfare increases with tying if 2N(VA-VM)<R.  However, if 
2N(VA-VM)>R, then tying decreases social welfare in these parameterizations.  So, if 2N(VA-VM)>R, 
then, as captured in Proposition 4, tying necessarily decreases social welfare. 
  As a final point, a key assumption of our argument here and in the previous section is that the 
monopolist and alternative producer cannot write long-term contracts in the first period that bind 
themselves to specific actions in the second period.  If they could do this in an unconstrained way, then 
the monopolist would not have an incentive to tie because there would always be a long-term contract 
consistent with individuals consuming the alternative producer’s superior complementary product in 
which profits are shared in such a way that both firms are better off than if the monopolist tied.  Further, 
in addition to making both firms better off, social welfare would also rise because individuals would 
consume the alternative producer’s superior complementary product and only the alternative producer 
would invest in research and development.  Despite the positive outcomes associated with such 
contracting, however, in real-world situations such contracts are frequently difficult or infeasible because 
of the difficulty of monitoring and enforcing contractual commitments concerning research and 
development and prices. 
  In summary, in this section we have shown that in the presence of consumer switching costs, 
even when the monopolist can lease, the monopolist can have an incentive to tie even though the 
monopolist’s primary good is essential for all uses of the complementary good.  The reason is that the 
switching cost means that if individuals consume the alternative producer’s complementary product in 
the first period, then the monopolist’s complementary product in the second period is perceived as lower 
                                                       
25 In our model, because all consumers are identical, no individuals consume the monopolist’s upgraded 
complementary product in the second period.  One could enrich the model, however, by adding some consumer 
heterogeneity, and have similar results where some individuals consume the monopolist’s upgraded complementary 
units in the second period but the main goal of the monopolist in upgrading is to reduce for the bulk of consumers the 
surplus associated with the alternative producer’s second-period complementary product.   23 
quality and thus a worse substitute for the alternative producer’s complementary product.  In other words, 
with switching costs the only way the monopolist can capture all of ￿ is to have individuals consume the 
monopolist’s complementary product in the first period.  The monopolist’s ability to extract all of ￿ in 
period 2 depends on individuals consuming the monopolist’s complementary product in period 1.  Only a 
tie will do this.  We also showed that tying in this case will frequently decrease social welfare, but in 
contrast to the analysis in the previous section this is not always the case.  It can decrease social welfare 
because it results in individuals consuming lower quality complementary units.  But it can also increase 
social welfare because for some parameterizations it reduces the aggregate expenditure on R&D.   
 
IV. EXTENSIONS 
  The previous two sections showed how the introduction of upgrades and switching costs can 
result in tying by a primary-good monopolist being optimal even when the monopolist’s primary good is 
essential for all uses of the complementary product.  In this section we discuss the robustness of our 
results to three ways of extending our analysis: i) the introduction of reversible ties; ii) relaxing the 
constraint on non-negative prices; and iii) the introduction of primary-product upgrades. 
 
Extension 1: Reversible Ties 
  Following Whinston (1990), in the analyses of Sections II and III we assumed that ties were not 
reversible, i.e., when the monopolist tied its primary and complementary products it was impossible for 
consumers to reverse the tie and make use of the alternative producer’s complementary product.  At least 
for the case of Microsoft this assumption is not always correct in that consumers can typically add an 
alternative producer’s complementary product to Windows even when Microsoft has tied a similar 
product to the Windows operating system.  In this discussion we consider what happens when, starting 
from a situation for which one of our earlier analyses indicates tying, we relax this assumption. 
  Suppose we instead assume that ties are completely reversible, i.e., when the monopolist ties its 
products there is no added cost associated with consumers adding the alternative producer’s 
complementary product to a system already consisting of the monopolist’s primary and complementary 
products.  In this case there would be no parameterizations in which tying is the unique equilibrium 
outcome.  The reason is that under perfect reversibility tying is equivalent to having the monopolist set 
the price of the complementary good at zero.  Hence, if there is an equilibrium in which the monopolist 24 
ties in order to stop consumers from purchasing or leasing the alternative producer’s complementary 
products, there must also be an equilibrium in which the monopolist markets its products individually but 
sets the price of the complementary good at zero. 
  Another possibility is that ties are somewhere between being perfectly reversible and perfectly 
irreversible.  That is, when the monopolist ties it is still possible for a consumer to add the alternative 
producer’s complementary product to a system consisting of the monopolist’s primary and 
complementary goods, but there is an added cost of doing so.  This added cost can be in the form of an 
added cost faced by the consumer, an increase in the alternative producer’s cost structure , or a lowering 
of the functionality of the alternative producer’s product.  For any of these cases, there will be some 
parameterizations in which the monopolist ties in order to stop consumers from purchasing or leasing the 
alternative producer’s complementary products. 
  The logic for this result is as follows.  For some parameterizations in which the monopolist wants 
to prohibit the alternative producer from selling or leasing its complementary good, the monopolist can 
achieve this result by setting the price for its complementary good at zero.  However, for other 
parameterizations a zero price for its complementary good is not low enough to foreclose the alternative 
producer from the complementary-good market, but a sufficiently low negative price would foreclose the 
alternative producer.  For any such parameterization, if ties are reversible but cause an increase in the 
cost associated with consumers adding the alternative producer’s product to a system, then the 
monopolist will tie if this cost is sufficiently large.  The reason is that, in this case, tying is equivalent to 
setting a negative price for the complementary good equal to the added cost.  In turn, since a sufficiently 
low negative price for the monopolist’s complementary good makes it unprofitable for the alternative 
producer to sell or lease its product, the monopolist will tie if this cost is sufficiently large.26 
  What is interesting about this discussion is that it is consistent with many of Microsoft’s tying 
decisions.  In many cases it is not just that Microsoft packages Windows and the applications program 
together, but in addition Microsoft takes actions that arguably make it more costly for consumers to use 
alternative producers’ products.27  Specifically, Microsoft frequently integrates the applications program 
directly into the Windows programming code rather than having the applications program be distinct 
                                                       
26 The argument here is an example of the idea that firms sometimes have an incentive to behave in ways that raise 
rivals’ costs.  See Salop and Scheffman (1983,1987) for early analyses of this idea. 
 
27 See Gilbert and Katz (2001) and Whinston (2001) for discussions of Microsoft’s behavior. 25 
code that connects to Windows through an interface.  This can make it more costly for consumers to use 
alternative producers’ products.28  Additionally, Microsoft tries to keep some applications programming 
interfaces secret which directly serves to either increase alternative producers’ costs or lower the 
functionality of the alternative producers’ products.  The discussion in this section provides one 
explanation for how this behavior can be in Microsoft’s interests.  
 
Extension 2: Relaxing the Constraint on Non-Negative Prices 
  An important aspect of our argument is that the monopolist has limited ability to capture second-
period consumer value associated with upgrades and consumer switching costs through first-period prices 
and first-period competition for the lease or sale of complementary units.  Such competition is clearly 
limited in our model because we assume that prices – in particular, first-period prices for the 
complementary good – cannot be negative (or contingent on second-period actions).  Here we discuss 
how the analysis would change given various ways of relaxing this constraint. 
  One way to relax the constraint is to allow negative prices, but retain the assumption that there is 
a lower bound on the price that can be charged for a complementary unit.  In other words, instead of the 
lower bound on the complementary-good price being zero, assume it equals some value Pc
L, Pc
L<0.  This 
change basically has no effect on the qualitative nature of the results.  It would still be the case in 
Proposition 2 that i) through iv) would hold for ￿ sufficiently large, i.e., in the case in which firms are 
restricted to selling their products the monopolist would tie if the increase in quality associated with 
upgrading was sufficiently large.  Also, in Proposition 4 it would still be the case that i) through v) would 
hold for ￿ and ￿ sufficiently large, i.e, in the case in which firms can sell or lease the monopolist would 
tie given sufficiently large upgrade profits and sufficiently large switching costs.  The only changes are 
that in the former case for any parameterization the minimum ￿ required for tying to be optimal would be 
higher, while in the latter case for any parameterization the minimum ￿ and ￿ required for tying to be 
optimal would be higher. 
                                                       
28 When Microsoft integrates the applications program directly into Windows the result can be the same as keeping 
applications programming interfaces secret.  That is, such integration makes it more difficult or maybe even 
impossible for an alternative producer to reverse engineer Microsoft’s applications program and have the alternative 
producer’s product interface with Windows in the same way that Microsoft’s program does.  The result is that 
alternative producers face higher costs or there is a reduction in the functionality of alternative producers’ products. 26 
  A second way to relax the non-negative price constraint is to assume that firms are allowed to set 
any price no matter how negative, but that firms are not able to monitor and ration how many units a 
consumer leases or purchases.  Relaxing the assumption this way has no effect on our results.  The reason 
is that under this assumption, although strictly negative prices are part of the choice set, no firm would 
ever choose to charge a strictly negative price in equilibrium.  This is because, if a firm were to charge a 
strictly negative price, consumers would maximize their net benefits by purchasing or leasing multiple 
units of the good with the strictly negative price (an infinite number of units if allowed) thus driving 
down the firm’s profitability.29 
  A third way of relaxing the non-negative price constraint is to assume that both the monopolist 
and the alternative producer can charge strictly negative prices, each consumer can be limited to leasing 
or purchasing a single unit of a product, and the monopolist can price discriminate in the sense that only 
consumers who purchase or lease a primary unit in the first period would be offered a strictly negative 
first-period price for the complementary unit.  If we assume that in addition to the N identical consumers 
that we assume in our basic analyses that there are a large number of consumers who place no value on 
the primary and complementary products (see footnote 29 for a related discussion), then even this 
assumption has no effect on the qualitative nature of the results.  The reason is that, given the existence 
of the additional consumers, the monopolist would be constrained to have the sum of first-period 
primary- and complementary-good prices be non-negative.  As a result, for sufficiently large ￿ the 
monopolist would still want to tie in Proposition 2 and for sufficiently large ￿ and ￿ the monopolist 
would still want to tie in Proposition 4. 
  In other words, one can relax the non-negative price constraint in various ways without changing 
the qualitative nature of the results.  One change that would affect the results is to assume that purchasing 
or leasing at a strictly negative price in the first period would obligate the consumer to purchase or lease 
the firm’s upgraded complementary good at some strictly positive price in the second period.  This would 
                                                       
29 An alternative way of relaxing the non-negative price constraint would be to assume that firms can limit each 
consumer to purchasing or leasing a single unit, but that in addition to the N identical consumers that we assume 
there are a large number of consumers who place no value on the primary and complementary goods.  As described 
above for the case in which no monitoring and rationing is possible, this way of relaxing the non-negative price 
constraint would have no effect on the results.  The reason is that, similar to the logic in the no-monitoring and 
rationing case, if a firm set a strictly negative price its profits would be driven down because it would attract 
consumers who purchased or leased at the strictly negative price and purchased or leased nothing else. 
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allow a firm to charge a strictly negative price in the first period without attracting consumers whose 
first-period purchasing and leasing contribute negatively to the firm’s overall profit.  But there are 
various reasons why this type of long-term contract might be difficult in practice.  For example, one 
could incorporate a potential moral-hazard problem in which firms could either invest R or zero in the 
research and development of the upgraded complementary product.  In such a world this type of long-
term contract would be problematic because the firm requiring the commitment on the part of its 
consumers would lose the incentive to invest R and develop a high-quality upgrade. 
 
Extension 3: Primary-Product Upgrades 
  In Sections II and III we assumed there were upgrades for the complementary good, but no 
upgrades for the monopolist’s primary product.  But clearly the real-world situations that our analysis is 
trying to address such as Microsoft’s behavior concerning Windows and IBM’s behavior in an earlier era 
were characterized by upgrades for both primary and complementary goods.  In this section we discuss 
how our analysis changes when primary-good upgrades are introduced. 
  Consider first the analysis of Section II in which there are no complementary-good switching 
costs.  We found that, if firms can sell or lease, then there is no reason for the monopolist to tie.  In that 
case introducing the option for the monopolist to invest in R&D and introduce a primary-good upgrade in 
the second period does not change the basic conclusion, i.e., there is still no reason for the monopolist to 
tie.  The reason is that the monopolist can still ensure itself profits at least equal to tying by selling 
individual products, upgrading, and pricing the complementary good each period at marginal cost.   
  Now suppose that firms can only sell their products.  At first one might think this should 
eliminate the result that tying can be optimal because the monopolist can capture the second-period 
complementary-good upgrade profits by optimally setting the second-period prices for its primary and 
complementary goods.  But this is incorrect.  Because in the second period consumers own the 
monopolist’s old primary good, consumers have the option of purchasing the alternative producer’s 
upgraded complementary good and nothing else.  As a result, the monopolist has limited ability to 
capture second-period complementary-good-upgrade profits by appropriately pricing individual products 
which means that for some parameterizations tying will still be optimal. 
  Now consider the analysis of Section III in which there are complementary-good switching costs.  
In this case we found that, if the switching costs and upgrade valuations are both sufficiently large, then 28 
the monopolist has an incentive to tie even when leasing is possible.  The reason is that, if the monopolist 
leases and individuals consume the alternative producer’s complementary good in the first period, then in 
the second period the monopolist’s complementary good is less attractive which means optimal pricing of 
second-period goods gives the monopolist limited ability to capture second-period profits that are due to 
the switching costs.  Now suppose in that analysis we introduced the option for the monopolist to invest 
in R&D and introduce a primary-good upgrade in the second period.  Even with an upgraded primary 
product, the monopolist would have limited ability to capture second-period switching cost profits by 
leasing individual products and optimally pricing second-period goods.  Hence, the basic finding that the 
monopolist would have an incentive to tie when switching costs are sufficiently large would be 
unchanged.  Or, in summary, from a qualitative standpoint, none of our results are affected by the 
introduction of primary-product upgrades. 
 
V. ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS 
A model such as ours showing that tie-in sales can be used to harm social welfare under certain 
circumstances would seem to suggest a basis for more vigorous antitrust enforcement.  But such 
reasoning is dangerous for several reasons.30  First, tie-in sales generally are designed to promote 
efficiencies.  Indeed, every product can be thought of as a tie-in sale, so any attack on the practice is 
likely to cause some harm to the extent it makes firms reluctant to use the practice.  Second, the only way 
to prevent a physical tie (as opposed to a contractual tie) is to interfere with the product design decision.  
This is akin to intervening within the firm.  Such intervention is rare in antitrust enforcement and for 
good reason, since the increased transaction cost of forcing transactions outside the firm could be large, 
as well as hard to determine ex ante.  
Intervention when contracts, rather than product design, are used to effectuate the tie would be 
consistent with current antitrust treatment.  For example, exclusive distribution achieved through contract 
has been attacked recently under our antitrust laws but exclusive distribution by the firm itself has not.  
Even here, we would urge caution since our models show that tie-ins can have ambiguous welfare 
consequences, and we are not convinced that economists can reliably identify ex ante those situations 
where welfare will decrease.  Our concern is heightened by the fact that relatively modest changes in 
                                                       
30 See Carlton and Waldman (2005) for a related discussion. 29 
assumptions can alter some of the model’s results.  For example, as stressed in our exposition, it is the 
non-simultaneity of transactions together with the dynamic pattern of play that yields our results.  
Although we believe our sequencing of decisions is reasonable for many industries, a change in that 
sequencing could alter our results.  We fear the enthusiasm to bring an antitrust case will obscure the 
difficulty of reliably identifying the sequencing decision.  In those situations where the facts indicate that 
our model applies, we recommend great caution before condemning a practice, giving great weight to 
plausible efficiencies. 
There are however two clear implications for antitrust policy from our results.  First, whenever a 
superior complementary producer exists and the monopolist ties in order to exclude this alternative 
producer, there is an incentive for a transaction to occur that eliminates the inefficiency of not using the 
superior product.  In such a case a merger between the monopolist and the producer of the superior 
complementary good would be desirable, even though it appears to turn a possible duopoly in the 
complementary good into a monopoly.  Second, absent a merger, there is an incentive for the producer of 
the superior complementary good to sign a contract with the monopolist to effectuate a tie that results in 
consumption of the efficient product.  One problem with this contract is dynamic consistency of 
incentives since investments in the second period need to be made.  This contract could restore efficiency 
but would require significant monitoring to overcome any dynamic inconsistencies.  Such detailed 
contracts are likely to raise the same antitrust question as a merger, yet like a merger could be efficient.31 
   
VI. CONCLUSION 
  The literature has identified various reasons for why a firm selling complementary products 
might tie including efficiency rationales, enhanced price discrimination, and monopolizing the tied-good 
market.  But the literature also indicates that in an important class of cases, i.e., settings in which the 
products are complementary and the tying good is essential, a monopolist of a primary good would never 
tie in order to earn monopoly profits in the tied-good market.  Since arguably many important real-world 
tying cases fall in this category including some of Microsoft’s tying decisions and also IBM’s in an 
earlier era, the literature’s result concerning whether one of the products is essential has important policy 
                                                       
31 We note that incentives to behave efficiently create incentives to alter the game played and the sequencing of 
decisions.  Making the game and decisions sequence endogenous would clearly be the right research path to pursue, 
but it is one that to our knowledge has had few, if any, contributions. 
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implications about the desirability of tying.  The focus of this paper has been to show that the result that a 
monopolist of an essential primary good will never tie in order to earn monopoly profits in the tied-good 
market does not apply when goods are durable. 
  The idea that a monopolist of a primary good would never tie in order to monopolize a 
complementary-good market when the primary product is essential was originally shown in Whinston 
(1990) in a one-period model.  Our analysis shows that two features of durable goods, product upgrades 
and consumer switching costs (both of which are prominent features of the Microsoft setting), can undo 
Whinston’s result in two ways.  The first is that, if firms only sell their products, then tying in the first 
period can help the monopolist capture profits associated with upgrade sales in the second period.  This 
occurs because, if the monopolist sells individual products and it is the alternative producer who sells 
complementary units, then there are no second-period sales from which the monopolist can capture 
second-period profits due to the upgrade.  This analysis also implies a rationale for leasing as an 
alternative to selling and tying.  The second is that, even if firms can lease, as long as switching costs are 
also important, then tying may be used in order to capture the second-period profits associated with the 
switching cost.  The logic here is that, if the monopolist leases individual products and in the first period 
individuals consume the alternative producer’s complementary product, then the monopolist has limited 
ability to capture second-period profits due to the switching cost because the switching cost increases the 
second-period difference in the value consumers place on the two complementary products. 
  In terms of the continuing public policy debate about Microsoft’s behavior, this paper and our 
earlier tying paper show that there are various theoretical arguments consistent with many of Microsoft’s 
tying decisions being driven by a desire to monopolize.  In our earlier paper, we showed that some of 
these decisions may be driven by a desire by Microsoft to preserve and extend its Windows monopoly.  
In this paper, we show that some of these decisions may be driven by a desire by Microsoft to 
monopolize markets that are complementary to Windows.  Although theoretical possibility by itself does 
not prove what Microsoft’s true motivations are, we believe that our two papers together throw doubt on 
the contention by some that economic theory does not support monopolization arguments in the type of 
environment inhabited by Microsoft today and IBM in an earlier era.  Despite this, we remain wary of 
overzealous use of antitrust to attack tie-in sales. 
  There are a number of directions in which the analysis in this paper can be extended, but three 
stand out.  First, we have considered two-period models with a single cohort of consumers who are in the 31 
market in both periods.  It might be of interest to extend the model so that there is a flow of new 
consumers in each period, in order to see how consumer growth affects the results.  Second, in our 
analysis the qualities of the initial products and the qualities associated with upgrading are taken as fixed 
as opposed to being decision variables of the primary-good monopolist and the alternative producer of 
the complementary good.  Given the interest in how Microsoft’s tying behavior affects the pace of 
innovation in the software industry, an interesting extension would be to incorporate into our analysis 
R&D choices that endogenously determine initial and upgrade qualities.32  Third, it might be fruitful to 
investigate how product-design decisions can influence the timing of moves and, in turn, equilibrium 





Proof of Proposition 1: Suppose first that the monopolist ties.  Then the alternative producer is not able 
to sell its complementary product.  Because consumers are identical and ￿=0, in this case equilibrium 
behavior is that the monopolist charges 2VM for the tied product in the first period, neither firm invests, 
and consumers purchase the tied product in the first period.  This yields monopoly profits the same as if 
there were no alternative producer, i.e., ￿M=￿M*=N[2VM-cp-cc]. 
  Now suppose the monopolist does not tie.  One equilibrium to the resulting subgame is that the 
monopolist charges VM-cc for the primary product, cc+￿ for its complementary product, the alternative 
producer charges (VA-VM)+cc for its complementary product, and consumers in the first period purchase 
primary units from the monopolist and complementary units from the alternative producer (this is 
equilibrium behavior since each firm’s pricing strategy is a best response to the other firm’s pricing 
strategy).  This yields the monopolist ￿M=￿M*.  Notice that since it is possible that the monopolist 
anticipates that this will be the equilibrium if the monopolist does not tie, one equilibrium to the full 
game is that the monopolist ties and ￿M=￿M*. 
  Suppose again the monopolist does not tie.  Since the monopolist had the option of tying and 
earning ￿M*, any equilibrium in which the monopolist does not tie must be such that ￿M￿￿M*.  Further, 
one equilibrium to the resulting subgame is that the monopolist charges VA-cc for the primary product, cc 
for its complementary product, the alternative producer charges cc for its complementary product, and 
consumers in the first period purchase primary units from the monopolist and complementary units from 
the alternative producer (this again is equilibrium behavior since each firm’s pricing strategy is a best 
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response to the other firm’s pricing strategy).  This yields the monopolist ￿M=￿M*+N(VA-VM).  Notice 
that since it is possible that the monopolist correctly anticipates that this will be the equilibrium if the 
monopolist does not tie, one equilibrium to the full game is characterized by the monopolist not tying and 
￿M>￿M*.  Further, using a similar argument one can show there are other equilibria of this sort.  Hence, 
there exist equilibria in which ￿M>￿M*. 
 
Proof of Lemma 1: Consider period 2.  Suppose the alternative producer does not invest.  Then its 
second-period profit equals zero.  Suppose only the alternative producer invests.  Then the alternative 
producer charges a second-period price for its upgraded complementary good equal to ￿, earns second-
period profit equal to N(￿-cc)-R, and the monopolist earns second-period profit equal to zero.  Suppose 
both firms invest.  Bertrand competition means that the monopolist charges cc for its upgraded 
complementary good, the alternative producer charges ￿ (cc+VA-VM) if VM+￿-VA￿(>)cc for its upgraded 
complementary good, consumers purchase the alternative producer’s upgraded complementary good, the 
alternative producer earns second-period profit equal to N(￿-cc)-R (N(VA-VM)-R) if VM+￿-VA￿(>)cc, and 
the monopolist earns second-period profit equal to -R.  Suppose VA>VM+(R/N)=VA*.  Then the above 
yields the alternative producer must invest.  But if the monopolist anticipates the alternative producer 
will invest, then the monopolist will not and i), ii), and iii) hold.  
 
Proof of Proposition 2: Suppose the monopolist ties.  Then the alternative producer cannot sell 
complementary units in either period and so it does not invest at the beginning of the second period.  This 
means the monopolist sells new tied units at the beginning of the first period at a price equal to 2VM, it 
invests R in the second period and then sells upgraded complementary units at a price ￿, and its overall 
profit equals N[2VM+￿-cp-2cc]-R. 
  Now suppose the monopolist does not tie.  Given VA>VA*, we know that if consumers purchase 
primary units from the monopolist and complementary units from the alternative producer in the first 
period, then i) through iii) of Lemma 1 holds.  Given the constraint that prices must be non-negative we 
have that the monopolist’s first-period price for its primary product cannot exceed 2VA, but this means its 
overall profit must be less than or equal to N[2VA-cp].  But comparing this expression with the profit 
expression given tying yields that, if ￿ is sufficiently large and VA>VA*, then the monopolist will tie if it 
anticipates that in the first period consumers will purchase primary units from the monopolist and 
complementary units from the alternative producer. 
  Now consider the first period.  If the monopolist does not sell primary units in the first period, 
then its overall profit is less than the profit it earns by tying so it would be better off tying.  If the 
monopolist sells primary units in the first period but no one sells complementary units, then again its 
overall profit is less than the profit it earns by tying so it would be better off tying. 33 
  The only other possibility is that the monopolist sells primary and complementary units in the 
first period.  Given our assumption that prices cannot be strictly negative, at any pair of first-period 
prices for which the monopolist might plausibly sell primary and complementary units, the alternative 
producer can set a first-period price of zero, sell complementary units in the first period, and earn overall 
profit equal to N[￿-2cc]-R which is strictly positive for ￿ sufficiently large.  Hence, if ￿ is sufficiently 
large, in the first period the monopolist sells primary units and the alternative producer sells 
complementary units.  Combining this with results above, we now have that if ￿ is sufficiently large and 
VA>VA*, then i) through iii) hold. 
  Finally, we have shown that, if ￿ is sufficiently large and VA>VA*, then the only difference from 
a social-welfare standpoint between the monopolist being allowed to tie and not being allowed to tie is 
that individuals consume the monopolist’s lower quality complementary products when the monopolist is 
allowed to tie and the alternative producer’s higher quality complementary products when it is not 
allowed to tie.  Hence, if ￿ is sufficiently large and VA>VA*, then W<W
N. 
   
Proof of Proposition 3: Suppose first that the monopolist ties and sells its products.  Then the alternative 
producer is not able to sell or lease its complementary product.  Because consumers are identical and 
N￿>R+Ncc, in this case equilibrium behavior is that the monopolist charges 2VM for the tied product in 
the first period, the monopolist invests and sells an upgraded complementary product in the second 
period for ￿, and consumers purchase the tied product from the monopolist in the first period and the 
upgraded complementary product from the monopolist in the second period.  This yields monopoly 
profits the same as if there were no alternative producer, i.e., ￿M=￿M*=N[2VM+￿-cp-2cc]-R. 
  Suppose now that the monopolist ties and leases its products.  Then again the alternative 
producer is not able to sell or lease its complementary product.  Because consumers are identical and 
N￿>R+Ncc, in this case equilibrium behavior is that the monopolist charges VM for the tied product in the 
first period, the monopolist invests and leases an upgraded tied product in the second period for VM+￿, 
and consumers lease the tied product from the monopolist in the first period and the upgraded tied 
product from the monopolist in the second period.  This also yields monopoly profits the same as if there 
were no alternative producer, i.e., ￿M=￿M*=N[2VM+￿-cp-2cc]-R. 
  We now consider what happens when the monopolist does not tie.  Let us start by considering 
period 2 in the case in which both firms leased in the first period.  One equilibrium to the resulting 
second-period subgame is that only the alternative producer invests, the monopolist charges VM+￿-cc-
(R/N) for the primary product, cc+￿ for its complementary product, the alternative producer charges VA-
VM+cc+(R/N) for its complementary product, and consumers lease primary units from the monopolist and 
upgraded complementary units from the alternative producer (one reason this is equilibrium behavior is 
that, if the monopolist chose to invest, then there is necessarily an equilibrium to the second-period 34 
pricing game in which second-period monopoly profits are no higher).  This yields second-period profits 
for the monopolist equal to N[VM+￿-cc]-R. 
  Now consider what happens in period 1 if at the beginning of the period both firms choose to 
lease.  Suppose that for any set of first-period behaviors the equilibrium to the second-period subgame is 
the one described above in which the monopolist earns second-period profits equal to N[VM+￿-cc]-R.  
Given this, one equilibrium set of first-period behaviors is that the monopolist charges VM-cc for the 
primary product, cc+￿ for its complementary product, the alternative producer charges VA-VM+cc for its 
complementary product, and consumers lease primary units from the monopolist and complementary 
units from the alternative producer.  This is an equilibrium set of first-period behaviors in that each 
firm’s choice maximizes its profits over the two periods given the other firm’s pricing behavior.  This 
yields first-period profit for the monopolist equal to N[VM-cp-cc] and profit over the two periods equal to 
N[2VM+￿-cp-2cc]-R. 
  We now have that one equilibrium to the subgame that starts after the monopolist chooses not to 
tie and both firms choose to lease has ￿M=￿M*=N[2VM+￿-cp-2cc]-R.  But similar arguments yield that for 
each of the other three possibilities associated with the monopolist choosing not to tie, i.e., both firms 
sell, the monopolist leases and the alternative producer sells, and the monopolist sells and the alternative 
producer leases, there is an equilibrium to the resulting subgame for which ￿M=￿M*.  Given this, suppose 
the monopolist anticipates that if it chooses not to tie the equilibrium for each possible subgame is the 
one that results in ￿M=￿M*.  Then the monopolist maximizes its profits by tying which means, given the 
above, there is an equilibrium with tying and leasing and an equilibrium with tying and selling and in 
both cases ￿M=￿M*. 
  Suppose again the monopolist does not tie.  Since the monopolist had the option of tying and 
earning ￿M*, any equilibrium in which the monopolist does not tie must be such that ￿M￿￿M*.  Given this, 
consider first period 2.  It is always the case that an equilibrium to the subgame starting in the second 
period is that only the alternative producer invests, pricing is such that the alternative producer earns 
second-period profits equal to zero, and the monopolist receives the remaining second-period surplus 
(which must be strictly positive given our parameter restrictions).  This is an equilibrium because the 
monopolist cannot possibly receive more by investing, while for any possible starting second-period 
situation not investing can result in profit for the alternative producer less than or equal to zero. 
  Given this, consider the first period and suppose that, for any first period set of behaviors, the 
equilibrium to the second-period subgame is the one described above in which the alternative producer 
invests and earns zero profits.  Then the alternative producer’s first-period behavior will maximize first-
period profits.  Taking all this as given, one equilibrium set of behaviors for the first period is that both 
firms lease, the monopolist charges VA-cc for its primary product, cc+￿ for its complementary product, the 
alternative producer charges cc for its complementary product, and consumers lease primary units from 
the monopolist and complementary units from the alternative producer. 35 
  This is equilibrium first-period behavior because over the two periods the monopolist is earning 
all the potential surplus so there cannot be an alternative first-period behavior for the monopolist that is 
better, while given the monopolist’s first-period strategy there is no alternative behavior for the 
alternative producer that yields strictly positive profits over the two periods.  This shows that there is one 
equilibrium to the full game characterized by the monopolist not tying and ￿M>￿M*.  Further, using a 
similar argument one can show that there are other equilibria of this sort.  Hence, there exist equilibria in 
which the monopolist does not tie and ￿M>￿M*.   
 
Proof of Lemma 2: There are four possibilities.  The first is that both firms invest.  Given our assumption 
that the surplus is split evenly across the two firms, we have that the monopolist prices the primary good 
at VM+￿-cc+[(VA-VM+￿)/2], the alternative producer prices its upgraded complementary good at [(VA-
VM+￿)/2]+cc, and consumers lease the primary good from the monopolist and the upgraded 
complementary good from the alternative producer (the monopolist prices its upgraded complementary 
good high enough that this price does not serve as a constraint on the price the alternative producer 
charges for its upgraded complementary good).  This yields second-period profits for the monopolist 
equal to N[VM+￿-cc+[(VA-VM+￿)/2]]-R and second-period profits for the alternative producer equal to 
N[(VA-VM+￿)/2]-R. 
  The second possibility is that neither firm invests.  Given our assumption that the surplus is split 
evenly across the two firms, we have that the monopolist prices the primary product at VM+[(VA-
VM+￿)/2], the alternative producer prices its complementary good at [(VA-VM+￿)/2], and consumers 
lease the primary good from the monopolist and the complementary good from the alternative producer 
(as before, the monopolist’s complementary-good price is high enough that it does not serve as a 
constraint).  This yields second-period profits for the monopolist equal to N[VM+[(VA-VM+￿)/2]] and 
second-period profits for the alternative producer equal to N[(VA-VM+￿)/2]] 
  The third possibility is that the alternative producer invests and the monopolist does not.  Given 
our assumption that the surplus is split evenly across the two firms, we have that the monopolist prices 
the primary product at VM+[(VA-VM+(￿-cc)+￿)/2], the alternative producer prices its upgraded 
complementary good at [(VA-VM+(￿-cc)+￿)/2]+cc, and consumers lease the primary good from the 
monopolist and the upgraded complementary good from the alternative producer (as before, the 
monopolist’s complementary-good price is high enough that it does not serve as a constraint).  This 
yields second-period profits for the monopolist equal to N[VM+[(VA-VM+(￿-cc)+￿)/2] and second-period 
profits for the alternative producer equal to N[(VA-VM+(￿-cc)+￿)/2]-R. 
  The fourth possibility is that the monopolist invests and the alternative producer does not.  There 
are two subcases.  The first subcase is that VA￿VM+(￿-cc)-￿.  In this subcase the alternative producer 
does not lease or sell anything in the second period so the firm’s second-period profit equals zero (when 36 
VA=VM+(￿-cc)-￿ the alternative producer might lease or sell complementary units in the second period 
but second-period profit still equals zero). 
  The second subcase is that VA>VM+(￿-cc)-￿.  Given our assumption that the surplus is split 
evenly across the two firms, in this case we have that the monopolist prices the primary product at 
VM+￿+[(VA-VM-(￿-cc)+￿)/2], the alternative producer prices its complementary good at [(VA-VM-(￿-
cc)+￿)/2], and consumers lease the primary good from the monopolist and the complementary good from 
the alternative producer (as before, the monopolist’s complementary-good price is high enough that it 
does not serve as a constraint).  This yields second-period profits for the monopolist equal to N[VM+￿-
cc+[(VA-VM-(￿-cc)+￿)/2]-R and second-period profits for the alternative producer equal to N[(VA-VM-(￿-
cc)+￿)/2].   
  Consider first the investment decision.  Suppose the alternative producer thinks the monopolist 
will not invest.  Then from above the return to the alternative producer investing is [N(￿-cc)/2]-R>0 so 
the alternative producer invests (see footnote 22).  Suppose the alternative producer thinks the 
monopolist will invest.  Then from above the return to the alternative producer investing is greater than 
or equal to min{[N(￿-cc)/2]-R,N(VA-VM+￿)/2]-R}>0 so the alternative producer invests (see again 
footnote 22).  That is, the alternative producer invests independent of whether or not it thinks the 
monopolist will invest.  Now consider the monopolist’s choice given it knows that the alternative 
producer will invest.  Then from above the return to the monopolist investing is [N(￿-cc)/2]-R>0, so the 
monopolist invests (see again footnote 22).  Thus, both firms invest.  This directly proves i) and ii), and 
then iii) and iv) follow from above. 
 
Proof of Proposition 4: Suppose the monopolist ties and leases.  Then in the first period it leases its tied 
product for VM and earns N[VM-cp-cc].  Given our parameter restrictions, in the second period the 
monopolist invests and the alternative producer does not, the monopolist leases the upgraded tied product 
for VM+￿+￿, and the monopolist earns N[VM+￿+￿-cc]-R.  The monopolist’s profit over the two periods 
is N[2VM+￿+￿-cp-2cc]-R. 
  Now suppose the monopolist ties and sells.  Then in the first period it sells its tied product for 
2VM+￿ and earns N[2VM+￿-cp-cc].  Given our parameter restrictions, in the second period the 
monopolist invests and the alternative producer does not, the monopolist sells the upgraded 
complementary product for ￿, and the monopolist earns N[￿-cc]-R.  The monopolist’s profit over the two 
periods is again N[2VM+￿+￿-cp-2cc]-R. 
  Now suppose the monopolist does not tie.  We first consider what happens when the monopolist 
does not tie and leases its products.  We start by considering the second period.  There are three 
possibilities concerning what is true at the beginning of the second period.  The first possibility is that the 
monopolist leased primary and complementary units in the first period.  If ￿ and ￿ are both sufficiently 
large, then in the second period only the monopolist invests, the monopolist leases primary and 37 
complementary units for a combined price of VM+￿+￿, the monopolist earns second-period profits equal 
to N[VM+￿+￿-cc]-R, and the alternative producer earns second-period profits equal to zero.  The second 
possibility is that the monopolist leased primary units and the alternative producer leased complementary 
units in the first period.  If ￿ and ￿ are both sufficiently large, then in the second period both firms invest, 
the monopolist leases primary units and the alternative producer leases complementary units, and the 
alternative producer’s profit equals N[(VA-VM+￿)/2]-R.  The third possibility is that the monopolist 
leased primary units and the alternative producer sold complementary units in the first period.  The 
details of what happens in this case are not required for our argument.   
  Now consider the first period.  If individuals consume the monopolist’s complementary product 
and ￿ and ￿ are both sufficiently large, then we know the alternative producer earns zero over the two 
periods.  Suppose the alternative producer offers to lease its complementary product at a price of zero in 
the first period.  Because prices cannot be strictly negative and the alternative producer has a superior 
complementary product, this must result in consumers leasing complementary units from the alternative 
producer.  Given the above, this means profits over the two periods for the alternative producer must be 
at least equal to N[((VA-VM+￿)/2)-cc]-R.  But given the participation constraint for consumers, we now 
have that monopoly profits over the two periods must be less than or equal to N[2VA+￿+￿-cp-2cc]-R-
[N[((VA-VM+￿)/2)-cc]-R].  If ￿ is sufficiently large, we now have that the monopolist is better off tying 
and either selling or leasing. 
  Now suppose the monopolist does not tie and sells its products.  We again start by considering 
the second period.  There are again three possibilities concerning what is true at the beginning of the 
second period.  The first possibility is that the monopolist sold primary and complementary units in the 
first period.  If ￿ and ￿ are both sufficiently large, then in the second period only the monopolist invests, 
the monopolist sells upgraded complementary units at ￿, the monopolist earns second-period profits 
equal to N(￿-cc)-R, and the alternative producer earns second-period profits equal to zero.  The second 
possibility is that the monopolist sold primary units and the alternative producer sold complementary 
units in the first period.  If ￿ and ￿ are both sufficiently large, then in the second period only the 
alternative producer invests, the alternative producer sells upgraded complementary units at ￿, the 
alternative producer earns second-period profits equal to N(￿-cc)-R, and the monopolist’s second-period 
profit equals zero.  The third possibility is that the monopolist sold primary units and the alternative 
producer leased complementary units in the first period.  If ￿ and ￿ are both sufficiently large, then in the 
second period only the alternative producer upgrades, the alternative producer leases upgraded 
complementary units, the alternative producer earns second-period profits equal to N[VA-VM+￿+￿]-R, 
and the monopolist’s second-period profit equals zero. 
  Now consider the first period.  If individuals consume the monopolist’s complementary product 
and ￿ and ￿ are both sufficiently large, then we know the alternative producer earns zero profits over the 
two periods.  Suppose the alternative producer offers to sell its complementary product at a price of zero 38 
in the first period.  Because prices cannot be strictly negative and the alternative producer has a superior 
complementary product, this must result in consumers purchasing complementary units from the 
alternative producer.  Given the above, this means profits over the two periods for the alternative 
producer must be at least equal to N(￿-2cc)-R.  But given the participation constraint for consumers, we 
now have that monopoly profits over the two periods must be less than or equal to N[2VA+￿+￿-cp-2cc]-R-
[N(￿-2cc)-R].  If ￿ is sufficiently large, we now have that the monopolist is better off tying and either 
selling or leasing. 
  Finally, from above we have that, if ￿ and ￿ are both sufficiently large and the monopolist does 
not tie, then individuals consume the alternative producer’s complementary product in the first period 
and the upgraded complementary product in the second period.  Relative to what happens under tying, 
this improves social welfare by 2N(VA-VM).  The only potential decrease in social welfare is that both 
firms rather than one firm invests which would lower social welfare by R.  If 2N(VA-VM)>R, then the 






Adams, W.J. and J.L. Yellen, “Commodity Bundling and the Burden of Monopoly,” Quarterly Journal of  
  Economics, 1976, 90, pp. 475-498. 
 
Bork, R.H., The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War with Itself, New York: Basic Books, 1978. 
 
Bowman, W.S., “Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem,” Yale Law Review, 1957, 67, pp. 19- 
  36. 
 
Bulow, J., “Durable Goods Monopolists,” Journal of Political Economy, 1982, 90, pp. 314-332. 
 
Carlton, D.W. and J.M. Perloff, Modern Industrial Organization, 4
th ed., New York: Addison Wesley,   
  2005. 
 
Carlton, D.W. and M. Waldman, “The Strategic Use of Tying to Preserve and Create Market Power in  
  Evolving Industries,” Rand Journal of Economics, 2002, 33, pp. 194-220. 
 
Carlton, D.W. and M. Waldman, “How Economics can Improve Antitrust Doctrine towards Tie-In  
  Sales,” Competition Policy International, 2005, 1, pp. 27-40. 
 
Choi, J.P., “Preemptive R&D, Rent Dissipation, and the ‘Leverage Theory,’” Quarterly Journal of  
  Economics, 1996, 110, pp. 1153-1181. 
 
Choi, J.P., “Tying and Innovation: A Dynamic Analysis of Tying Arrangements,” Economic Journal,  
  1996, 114, pp. 83-101. 
 39 
Choi, J.P. and C. Stefanadis, “Tying, Investment, and the Dynamic Leverage Theory,” Rand Journal of  
  Economics, 2001, 32, pp. 52-71. 
 
Coase, R., “Durability and Monopoly,” Journal of Law and Economics, 1972, 15, pp. 143-149. 
 
Director, A. and E. Levi, “Law and the Future: Trade Regulation,” Northwestern University Law Review, 
  1956, 51, pp. 281-296. 
 
Evans, D. and M. Salinger, “Why do Firms Bundle and Tie? Evidence from Competitive Markets and  
  Implications for Tying Law,” Mimeo, Boston University, 2004 (Forthcoming Yale Journal of  
  Regulation). 
 
Farrell, J. and C. Shapiro, “Dynamic Competition with Switching Costs,” Rand Journal of Economics,  
  1988, 19, pp. 123-137. 
 
Farrell, J. and C. Shapiro, “Optimal Contracts with Lock-In,” American Economic Review, 1989,  79, pp.  
  51-68. 
 
Fudenberg, D. and J. Tirole, “Upgrades, Tradeins, and Buybacks,” Rand Journal of Economics, 1988, 29,  
  pp. 235-258. 
 
Gandal, N., S. Markovich, and M. Riordan, “Ain’t it ‘Suite’? Strategic Bundling in the PC Office  
  Softward Market,” Mimeo, Columbia University, 2004. 
 
Gilbert, R.J. and M.L. Katz, “An Economist’s Guide to U.S. v. Microsoft,” Journal of Economic  
  Perspectives, 2001, 15, pp. 25-44. 
 
Hendel, I. and A. Lizzeri, “Interfering with Secondary Markets,” Rand Journal of Economics, 1999, 30,  
  pp. 1-21. 
 
Hendel, I. and A. Lizzeri, “The Role of Leasing under Adverse Selection,” Journal of Political Economy,  
  2002, 110, pp. 113-143. 
 
Johnson, J. and M. Waldman, “Leasing, Lemons, and Buybacks,” Rand Journal of Economics, 2003, 34,  
  pp. 247-265. 
 
Klemperer, P., “Markets with Consumer Switching Costs,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1987, 102,  
  pp. 375-394. 
 
Klemperer, P. “Price Wars Caused by Switching Costs,” Review of Economic Studies, 1989, 56, pp. 405- 
  420. 
 
Klemperer, P., “Competition when Consumers have Switching Costs: An Overview with  Applications to  
  Industrial Organization, Macroeconomics, and International Trade,” Review of Economic Studies, 
  1995, 62, pp. 515-539. 
 
Lee, I.H. and J. Lee, “A Theory of Economic Obsolescence,” Journal of Industrial Economics, 1998, 46,  
  pp. 383-401. 
 
 40 
Morita, H. and M. Waldman, “Durable Goods, Monopoly Maintenance, and Time Inconsistency,” 2004,  
  13, 273-302. 
 
Nalebuff, B., “Bundling as an Entry Barrier,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2004, 119, pp. 159-187. 
 
Nash, J.F., “The Bargaining Problem,” Econometrica, 1950, 18, pp. 155-162. 
 
Ordover, J.A., A.O. Sykes, and R.D. Willig, “Nonprice Anticompetitive Behavior by Dominant Firms  
  Toward the Producers of Complementary Products,” In F.M. Fisher, ed., Antitrust and  
  Regulation: Essays in Memory of John J. McGowan, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1985. 
 
Posner, R.A., Antitrust Law, An Economic Perspective, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976. 
 
Salop, S.C. and D. Scheffman, “Raising Rivals’ Costs,” American Economic Review, 1983, 73, pp. 267- 
  271. 
 
Salop, S.C. and D. Scheffman, “Cost Raising Strategies,” Journal of Industrial Economics, 1987, 36, pp.  
  19-34. 
 
Stigler, G., “United States v. Loew’s Inc.: A Note on Block Booking,” The Supreme Court Review, 1963,  
  1, pp. 152-157. 
 
Waldman, M., “Planned Obsolescence and the R&D Decision,” Rand Journal of Economics, 1996, 27,  
  pp. 583-595. 
 
Waldman, M., “Eliminating the Market for Secondhand Goods,” Journal of Law and Economics, 1997,  
  40, pp. 61-92. 
 
Waldman, M., “Durable Goods Theory for Real World Markets,” Journal of Economic Perspectives,  
  2003, 17, pp. 131-154. 
 
Whinston, M.D., “Tying, Foreclosure, and Exclusion,” American Economic Review, 1990, 80, pp. 837- 
  859. 
 
Whinston, M.D., “Exclusivity and Tying in U.S. v. Microsoft: What We Know, and Don’t Know,”  








     41 
         